Wire fraud against family offices rarely looks like hacking. It looks like an ordinary email from a trusted vendor announcing new bank details, or an urgent note from a principal who is traveling and needs a transfer completed today.
The first control is simple and non-negotiable: every change to payment instructions is verified by calling a number already on file—never one supplied in the request. This single habit defeats the majority of attempts.
Second, separate duties. The person who receives a payment request should not be the only person who approves and releases it. Dual approval above a defined threshold removes the single point of failure attackers rely on.
Third, protect the inboxes themselves. Hardware security keys for every staff member and principal, monitoring for lookalike domains, and alerts on new mail-forwarding rules close the doors attackers use to observe conversations before striking.
Finally, rehearse. A short tabletop exercise each quarter—what we do if a transfer has already gone—means the team knows exactly whom to call. Recovery is often possible, but only within the first hours.
How wire fraud against family offices works
Business email compromise remains one of the costliest forms of cybercrime reported to the FBI, with billions of dollars in reported losses each year. Criminals compromise or imitate an email account belonging to a principal, advisor, attorney or vendor, study ongoing transactions and then send convincing payment instructions at exactly the right moment—often near a real deadline such as a property closing or capital call.
Family offices are attractive because they move large sums, rely on small teams and often depend on informal trust between long-standing relationships. Increasingly, attackers add AI-generated voice calls or video to reinforce the fake request.
Controls that stop most losses
Write down a payment policy and follow it every time. Any new or changed beneficiary details must be verified by calling a number already on file—never one supplied in the request. Require two people to approve transfers above a defined threshold, and set a short cooling-off period for first-time beneficiaries.
Protect the accounts that send instructions: enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication such as security keys or passkeys, monitor for suspicious mailbox forwarding rules, and use email authentication (SPF, DKIM and DMARC) on the office domain so others cannot easily send mail as you. Ask your bank about positive pay, beneficiary allow-lists and call-back services.
Training the people who move money
Most frauds succeed because someone is rushed. Make it explicitly safe for staff to delay a payment to verify it, even when a principal appears to demand urgency. Run short tabletop exercises once or twice a year walking through a realistic fraudulent request and the first hours of response. Include outside advisors, because attackers frequently impersonate them.
If money has already moved
Contact the sending bank immediately and ask for a recall, then file a report with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center. Speed matters: recovery chances fall sharply after the first day.
Frequently asked questions
- What is the most effective way to prevent wire fraud?
- Independent verification. Confirm every new or changed payment instruction by calling a known number on file, and require dual approval for large transfers.
- What should I do immediately after a fraudulent wire?
- Call your bank to request a recall, file a complaint with the FBI's IC3, preserve emails and logs, and secure the compromised accounts. Acting within hours matters most.
- Does DMARC stop business email compromise?
- It helps prevent criminals from sending email that appears to come from your exact domain, but it does not stop look-alike domains or compromised accounts, so verification procedures remain essential.
Sources and further reading
- FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)
- FBI — Business Email Compromise
- CISA — Secure Our World
- FBI IC3 — Annual Internet Crime Report
- CISA — Phishing guidance
- FinCEN — Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
- FIDO Alliance — Passkeys explained
External resources are provided for general information. This article is not legal, financial or security advice for your specific situation.


