Family Office · 7 min read · September 24, 2026
Stopping wire fraud in family offices: a practical control framework
Payment redirection is the most costly threat most family offices face. These are the controls that stop it before money moves.
Wire fraud against family offices rarely looks like hacking. It looks like an ordinary email from a trusted vendor announcing new bank details, or an urgent note from a principal who is traveling and needs a transfer completed today.
The first control is simple and non-negotiable: every change to payment instructions is verified by calling a number already on file—never one supplied in the request. This single habit defeats the majority of attempts.
Second, separate duties. The person who receives a payment request should not be the only person who approves and releases it. Dual approval above a defined threshold removes the single point of failure attackers rely on.
Third, protect the inboxes themselves. Hardware security keys for every staff member and principal, monitoring for lookalike domains, and alerts on new mail-forwarding rules close the doors attackers use to observe conversations before striking.
Finally, rehearse. A short tabletop exercise each quarter—what we do if a transfer has already gone—means the team knows exactly whom to call. Recovery is often possible, but only within the first hours.